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Abstract and Keywords
Groups are used to make many important societal decisions. Similar to individuals, by
paying attention to the information available during the decision processes and the
consequences of the decisions, groups can learn from their decisions as well. In addition,
group members can learn from each other by exchanging information and being exposed
to different perspectives. However, groups make decisions in many different ways and the
potential and actual learning that takes place will vary as a function of the manner in
which groups reach consensus. This chapter reviews the literature on group decision
making with a special emphasis on how and when group decision making leads to
learning. We argue that learning is possible in virtually any group decision-making
environment, but freely interacting groups create the greatest potential for learning. We
also discuss when and why groups may not always take advantage of the learning
potential.
Keywords: group decision making, group learning, aggregation strategies, prediction markets, judge–advisor
systems, group biases

Life is full of decisions. On any given day, for example, people choose when to leave for
work, what project should take precedence, what route to take home to minimize traffic,
what to have or where to stop for dinner, and what time they should go to bed. Many of
these decisions are made with little thought, and the outcomes often are fairly routine
(e.g., most people leave for work at a similar time each day depending on when they need
to make it to their workplace). More important or complex decisions require acquiring
information, compiling it into a usable form, and then weighing decision options based on
the information to choose the best (or at least an acceptable) alternative. But regardless
of their importance or complexity, the outcomes people receive following a decision allow
them to learn about both the decision environment and the decision processes used. If the
outcomes match or exceed expectations (e.g., reached work on time, recently purchased
product works better than expected, etc.), people will continue to make similar decisions
using similar processes. However, if the outcomes are below expectations (e.g., showing
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up late for work, the product does not function properly, etc.), then different decision
alternatives will be considered (e.g., leaving for work earlier, trying another product
brand, etc.). Thus, virtually all decision situations allow for the possibility of learning.
Although decision making is often seen as an individual behavior, many decisions involve
a social or group component (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Tindale, Talbot, & Martinez, 2013).
For example, parliaments, city councils, and corporate boards make many of the
important decisions for their constituents or organizations. However, even when a single
person makes the final decision, other people may have been involved. People often talk
to friends and family members about important decisions in their lives. Managers
typically discuss decisions with other managers or members of their departments before
finalizing decisions. Even individual purchase decisions often are informed by consumer
comment lists or listservs relevant to the decision. The social nature of these decisions
provides additional avenues for learning. Learning not only occurs from evaluating
decision outcomes; it can also occur prior to making a decision through interactions with
other people.
There are also a number of ways that learning can occur during group or collective
decision making. Much like individuals, groups can learn from the feedback they receive
from the environment. If their decision leads to the outcomes they intended, then they
made a good decision (although outcome feedback is not always reliable). If the decision
leads to poor outcomes, the group may alter its decisions in the future to avoid such
outcomes. Groups can also learn from observing the outcomes received by other similar
groups. Often groups faced with important decisions will attempt to gather information
from external sources before making a decision, which offers another avenue for
learning. Groups can also learn from observing what other groups have done, even if the
outcomes of their decisions are unknown. If nothing else, knowing what other groups
have done can expand the pool of possible decision alternatives.
Learning in groups can flow from the resources contained within the group as well. Often
group members bring different types of knowledge and experiences to the decision
situation. During group interaction and discussion, different group members can learn
whether their preferences are shared by other group members or whether they hold
minority opinions (Levine & Tindale, 2015; Nemeth, 1986). Also, group members can
learn new information as other members share the information they possess (Stasser &
Titus, 1985; Stasser, 1999). Although research has shown that groups are not naturally
inclined to optimal information sharing (see Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012, for a recent
review), there are many group decision situations where members do learn new
information from other members (Tindale, Stawiski, & Jacobs, 2008).
Although there are many ways that learning can occur during group decision making, the
amount and type of learning is constrained by the way in which the group decisions are
made (Kerr & Tindale, 2011). A number of group decision-making methods simply
aggregate member preferences to produce a final judgment or decision (Larrick & Soll,
2006). Although these methods tend to produce quite accurate judgments (the “wisdom
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of crowds” effect; Surowiecki, 2004), they often limit the amount of learning that can
occur. Other methods (e.g., the Delphi method) allow limited feedback to members during
the group decision-making process, but they still limit the amount of learning that can
occur. Recent work using auctions or prediction markets (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, &
Wright, 1992; Maciejovsky, & Budescu, 2007) has been shown to be accurate and also
allow for learning to occur under some conditions. Another common group decisionmaking technique that has garnered a fair amount of research attention involves a single
decision maker with one or more advisees who provide input to the decision-making
process (i.e., judge–advisor systems; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Such systems should, in
principle, lead to asymmetric learning (i.e., the judge learns more than the advisors), but
little research has explored judge–advisor systems as group learning environments.
Finally, groups that make face-to-face decisions with deliberation should produce many
types of learning. However, even under such optimal circumstances, learning may or may
not occur in such groups (Baumann & Bonner, 2011; Littlepage, Robison, & Reddington,
1997).
In this chapter, we will review the current literature on group decision making in relation
to how groups and group members can learn during the process. Throughout the chapter
we will consider both learning by individual group members and learning by the group
collectively as forms of “group” learning. Although they are not identical (e.g., a single
member may learn something but choose not to share it with the other members so the
group never collectively knows or uses the information), they both involve learning, and
individual member learning may often lead to more thorough collective learning as well.
Some of the work we review directly addresses what and how groups learn while
deciding (e.g., Baumman & Bonner, 2011). However, as previously argued, most if not all
decision situations allow for learning. Thus, we also review work on group decision
making that does not focus on learning per se but is relevant to what groups do/could
learn during the decision-making process. In addition, much of our focus will be on how
groups access, share, and use information in the process of making decisions and how
such information processing affects the potential for learning (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath,
1997).
We will organize the group decision-making literature according to the amount of
member interaction that the decision-making process allows (Kerr & Tindale, 2011;
Tindale & Kluwe, 2015). As one might expect, the more interaction the decision-making
process allows, the greater the opportunity for group and group member learning.
However, even when member interaction is limited, groups can still learn, and learning
can be quite meager even when conditions appear optimal. We will conclude with a
discussion of what we know so far and where future research is needed to further
delineate the relationship between decision making and learning in groups.
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Simple Aggregation: Review
Although group decision making is often conceptualized as a set of individuals discussing
and reaching consensus on some course of action, many group decisions are not made
that way. Often, members’ preferences are simply aggregated by one member (or a
person outside the group), and the aggregate is used as the group’s position or choice.
For example, elections or surveys are often used to guide decision making in larger
organizations where face-to-face interaction among all the members would be impossible
or prohibitively expensive to produce. Usually such systems are justified on fairness or
equal representation principles, but most of the relevant research has shown that such
systems can produce quite accurate judgments (Ariely et al., 2000; Armstrong, 2001;
Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Larrick & Soll, 2006). This accuracy, relative to judgments made
by individuals, was referred to by Surowiecki (2004) as “the wisdom of crowds.” This
phenomenon has now been replicated many times in a number of diverse problem
domains (Larrick & Soll, 2006; Surowiecki, 2004). Ariely et al. (2000) showed that,
assuming pairwise conditional independence and random individual error distributions
(although this assumption is not satisfied in many decision contexts), the average of J
probability estimates (J = the number of estimators) will always be better than any of the
component individual estimates. In addition, as J increases, the average will tend toward
perfect calibration diagnosticity (accurate representation of the true state of affairs),
even when information provided to the various estimators is less than optimal. In
addition, Johnson et al. (2001) empirically showed the accuracy advantage of the average
probability estimate to be robust over a number of conditions, even when individual
estimates were not independent. Recent work on forecasting has shown that a simple
average of multiple independent forecasts will be more accurate than the responses of
individual experts and will often be as accurate as the output of more sophisticated
aggregation techniques (Armstrong, 2001).
Larrick and Soll (2006) have explained the advantage of simple averages over individual
judgments using the concept of “bracketing.” Assuming that the group member
judgments are independent, different members will make somewhat different estimates,
with some of the estimates above the “true score” and others below it. Thus, the
estimates “bracket” the true score. When this is true, it can be shown mathematically
that the average of the multiple estimates will always be more accurate than the average
individual judge. If the true score is well bracketed by the multiple estimates (near the
median or average), the aggregate accuracy will be far superior to judgments by single
individuals. However, even if the true score is closer to one of the tails of the distribution,
the average will still outperform the typical individual, though not to the same degree.
Larrick and Soll (2006) also show that even when the true score is not bracketed by the
estimates, the group (average) will do no worse than the typical individual judge.
Although the simple average is the most often used aggregation technique, there are
others that also have been used to provide group-level responses. A number of authors
have argued for the median as a viable, if not preferred, alternative to the mean (Black,
1958; Hora, Fransen, Hawkins, & Susel, 2012; Kerr & Tindale, 2011). In many
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circumstances, means and medians will be very similar, especially when large groups are
used. However, when group size is small, medians are less sensitive to extreme member
estimates and may provide a more accurate representation of the central tendency of the
group. When decision problems involve discrete alternatives, aggregation systems often
use the mode (majority/plurality response) to define the group response. There is
considerable evidence that majority/plurality responses do quite well in a number of
decision situations and often perform better than an individual baseline (Hastie &
Kameda, 2005; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). In addition, Sorkin, West, and Robinson (1998)
have shown that majority models come very close to optimal performance when group
member expertise is not knowable.
Although central tendency aggregation models have been shown to do quite well in
various situations (Larrick & Soll, 2006), a number of researchers have attempted to
improve aggregate forecasts by modifying the aggregation procedure, or the weights
given to individual members (Aspinall, 2010; Budescu & Chen, 2014; Lee, Zhang, & Shi,
2011). Some attempts have been made to use Bayesian models to aggregate multiple
forecasts, though it is often difficult to define the appropriate prior probabilities and
likelihood functions (see Budescu, 2006). Others have proposed weighting the opinions of
more expert members more heavily than those of members with less expertise (Aspinall,
2010). However, regression to the mean and measurement error can lead to
overweighting of supposed experts in future aggregations. Recently, Budescu and Chen
(2013) formulated a method for improving group forecasts by eliminating group members
whose forecasts detract from the group performance. They had group members make
probabilistic forecasts for a variety of events and then assessed whether the group’s
forecast was better or worse when each group member was included in (or removed
from) the aggregate. By only including those members whose forecasts showed a positive
influence on accuracy, they consistently improved the accuracy of the group forecasts
relative to the simple average and other less effective weighting schemes, and the
improvements persisted for future judgments not used to define the inclusion criteria (see
also Mellers et al., 2014).

Implications for Learning
The learning associated with simple aggregation could range from almost none to a
substantial amount depending on what role a person plays in the process and the type of
feedback available. Given that aggregation tends to work best when individual estimates
are independent (Ariely et al., 2000), the process works best when individuals are not
allowed to interact. Thus, members may learn nothing more than they already knew. Even
if members learn of the final decision, they will not necessarily know how the aggregation
affected the final choice. However, people involved in the aggregation (via summarizing
and analyzing the data) can potentially learn quite a bit. Organizations quite often survey
members to help make decisions on important issues (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012).
Given the general accuracy of such aggregations, organizations can learn what the most
likely outcome is or the most typical members’ preferences are and use that information
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to make more informed decisions. The organization can also learn the degree of
consensus or dispersion of opinion of its members on the topic of interest.
If members receive feedback about the aggregation process and the outcomes thereof,
they can potentially learn a great deal from the process. For example, often elections are
won based on a majority or plurality decision rule. In such cases, simply finding out who
won provides insight into the preference distribution. It also informs members whether
their preferences were similar to or different from others. Often feedback on more than
just the final outcome is also available. Most media reports concerning elections also
present information on the margin of victory and discuss how different segments of the
population (e.g., race, gender, region, income level, etc.) voted. Thus, members can learn
much about their position vis-à-vis that of others within the society or organization. In
addition, research has shown that simply learning whether one is in the majority or the
minority on an issue can lead to different thought processes (Nemeth, 1986) and to
different levels of effort to learn more information about the issue (Levine, Bogart, &
Zdaniuk, 1996). Thus, under the right circumstances, even decision processes that allow
for no interaction among group members can still lead to learning for both the group
members and the larger organization within which they are embedded.

Aggregation With Limited Interaction: Review
Although simple aggregation tends to produce fairly accurate decisions, a potential
downside is that members do not share information or defend their positions. In addition,
group members often remain unaware of others’ positions and the final group product.
Although little is often gained by member exchanges (Armstrong, 2006; Lorenz, Rauhut,
Schweitzera, & Helbing, 2011), it is difficult for members with particular insights or
important information to have influence without some type of interchange among group
members (Kerr & Tindale, 2011). Obviously, full group deliberation (a topic discussed
later) would allow such members to share and defend their positions. However, the most
influential members in freely interacting groups are not always the most accurate or
correct because influence is driven by status or confidence (Littlepage et al., 1997). Thus,
decision-making approaches are often compromise procedures in which some information
exchange is allowed but pressures toward conformity and incidental influence are
minimized.
Probably the most famous of these procedures is the Delphi technique (Dalkey, 1969;
Rowe & Wright, 1999; 2001). This technique has been used in idea generation and
forecasting most often, but it has also been adapted to other situations (Rohrbaugh,
1979). The procedure starts by having a group of (typically) experts make a series of
estimates, rankings, idea lists, and so forth on some topic. A facilitator then compiles the
list of member responses and summarizes them in a meaningful way (e.g., mean rank or
probability estimate, list of ideas with generation frequencies, etc.). The summaries are
given back to the group members, and they are allowed to revise their initial estimates.
The group members are typically anonymous and the summaries do not specify which
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ideas or ratings came from each member. This procedure allows information from the
group to be shared among the group members but avoids conformity pressure or undue
influence by high-status members. The procedure can be repeated as many times as
seems warranted but is usually ended when few if any revisions are recorded. The final
outcome can range from a list of ideas, each associated with the number of members
mentioning it, to a choice for the most preferred outcome or the central tendency (mean
or median) estimate. A number of related techniques (e.g., nominal group technique; Van
de Ven & Delbecq, 1974) use similar procedures but vary in terms of how much
information is shared and whether group members can communicate directly. Overall, the
purpose of these procedures is to allow for some information exchange while holding
potential distortions due to social influence in check. Research on the Delphi technique
has tended to show positive outcomes. Delphi groups do better than single individuals
and do at least as well as, if not better than, face-to-face groups (Rohrbaugh, 1979). They
have also been found to work well in forecasting situations (Rowe & Wright, 1999, 2001).
A limited-interaction aggregation technique that is useful for multicue decision
environments is the social judgment technique (Brehmer, 1976), which is based on the
lens model approach developed by Brunswick (1955) and applied to decision analysis by
Hammond (1965). In the group decision-making domain, the technique is used to help
resolve cognitive conflicts among group members. Cognitive conflicts involve members’
differences in how to achieve a particular set of outcomes that are common or preferred
among the group members (e.g., how to choose the best advertisement for our shared
business interests). The technique begins by having individual members make a series of
judgments based on cues available in the environment. A non–group member then
analyzes each individual’s mental decision model by calculating the regression weights
for each cue for each member. The individuals’ “mental models” are then shared with the
members of the group. This allows members to see both how they made their judgments
and also why other members might have made different judgments. At this point, the
members then discuss the decision problems and attempt to reach consensus on the best
model and subsequently the best judgment. The discussion should focus on the
differences among the models rather than simply arguing over which of the judgments
was best. The technique has not received that much empirical attention, but studies that
have compared it to other decision techniques show it performs as well as other
techniques (e.g., Delphi and nominal group technique) and can lead to greater member
satisfaction with the process (Rohrbaugh, 1979, 1981).
A more recent technique involving aggregation with limited interaction uses prediction
markets (cf. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). Much like financial markets, prediction markets
use buyers’ willingness to invest in alternative events (e.g., Obama will win vs. McCain
will win in the 2008 US Presidential election) as a gauge of their belief in the likelihood
that the event will occur. These markets typically do not prohibit direct communication
among forecasters/investors/bettors, but, in usual practice, there is little such
communication (if any). However, since the value placed on the assets is typically set in
an open market of buyers and sellers, those already in or out of the markets can be
informed and swayed by various market indicators (e.g., movements in prices, trading
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volume, volatility), and thus mutual social influence can occur through such channels.
The simple “initial forecasts–group aggregation–final forecast” sequence does not really
apply to this method very well. It is a much more dynamic and continuous aggregation
process, in which bids and offers can be made, accepted, and rejected by multiple parties,
and the collective expectations of the “group” can continue to change right up to the
occurrence of the event in question (e.g., an election). Except for those with ulterior
motives (e.g., to manipulate the market, or to use the market as a form of insurance),
investments in such markets are likely to reflect the investors’ honest judgments about
the relative likelihood of events. Members can use current market values to adjust their
thinking and learn from the behavior of other members. However, such investment
choices are not accompanied by any explanation or justification. Indeed, such investors
may even have incentives to withhold vital information because it would make other
investors’ choices more accurate (e.g., inflate the price of a “stock” one wants to
accumulate). Thus, in terms of opportunities for mutual education and persuasion,
prediction markets fall somewhere between statistical aggregation methods (which allow
none) and face-to-face groups (which allow many). Although these techniques sometimes
overestimate the likelihood of very rare events, they have been shown to be extremely
accurate in a number of group decision environments (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, &
Wright, 1992; Rothchild, 2009; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004).

Implications for Learning
Each of the group decision-making procedures in this section provides additional avenues
for learning compared to the simple aggregation procedures (Kerr & Tindale, 2011).
However, the number of additional avenues and the amount of actual learning that occurs
depend on how they are used. For example, the Delphi technique explicitly allows for
preference or response information to be shared among group members. Usually the
information is provided with frequency counts indicating how many members chose or
endorsed a particular response. Thus, members can learn whether their responses were
normative, or typical, for this particular group. The technique does not require members
to learn how or why responses were chosen, but it does not explicitly rule out such
information. If members were chosen for their particular areas of expertise, members
whose choices were divergent from most others’ choices may begin to rethink why they
chose how they did and thus learn from the process (Burnstein, 1982). The technique also
involves multiple rounds in most cases, so members can see how preferences changed
over time and which responses tended to gain or lose members. The organization using
the technique also gains all of this information. However, members (and the organization)
typically do not gain information about the reasoning behind member responses because
they are not provided (though, in theory, they could be).
The nominal group technique (NGT) and the social judgment technique (SJT) start out
much like the Delphi technique by asking individuals to respond to a particular decision
issue. NGT mimics the first round of the Delphi technique almost exactly, while SJT asks
individuals to make a series of multicue judgments in the same domain. However, after
the first round, NGT and SJT involve an open discussion among members rather than
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simply a chance to realign their initial judgments or lists. Thus, members can learn from
both the initial information provided by the summarization performed after the first
round and from the interaction among the members. Members can exchange information
about the pros and cons of each alternative and, in the case of SJT, they can also discuss
the reasoning behind the cue-weighting schemes they used, assuming they were
cognizant of the schemes they were using (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). We will go into more
detail about the pros and cons of group discussion on learning in a later section, but it
can be noted here that typically discussion allows for additional avenues for learning.
There is not much research on learning from prediction markets, although there is a
growing body of evidence supporting their accuracy as a decision-making procedure
(Rothchild, 2009; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). Organizations that use prediction markets
for decision making can learn from the final market values and outcomes in the same way
organizations learn from aggregated judgments in surveys. However, little attention has
been paid to what the individual investors or participants learn in prediction markets. A
notable exception is a study by Maciejovsky and Budescu (2007), who had people
participate in a competitive auction bidding for information in order to solve the Wason
card task problem, which requires testing a hypothesis using evidence. The task tends to
be quite difficult, and base rates for solution in standard populations are 10% or less.
Maciejovsky and Budenscu ran auctions under a number of different feedback conditions
and assessed both group performance during the auctions and individual performance on
the task after participating in the auctions. The key aspect for learning appeared to be
feedback. When no feedback was given to members, no evidence of learning was found.
However, if members received either private feedback about their bids on solutions or
public feedback about both their and others’ bids, participants were better at solving
such problems (chose the appropriate evidence in an efficient manner) after having
participated in the auctions. Performance both during the auction and on the subsequent
transfer-of-learning task was best in the public feedback condition. Thus, even with very
minimal information exchange among members, groups and their members can learn to
solve difficult problems simply by observing the market outcomes associated with their
behavior.

Judge–Advisor Systems: Review
Vroom and Yetton (1973) argued that one of the ways managers make decisions is
through consultation. That is, the decision is made by the manager but only after getting
advice from important members of the team or organization. Sniezek and Buckley (1995)
referred to this mode of social decision making as the “judge–advisor” systems approach.
The judge is responsible for the final decision, but he or she seeks out suggestions from
various advisors. Such systems have recently received a fair amount of research attention
(see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006, for a review). Based on the research discussed earlier,
unless the judge had far more expertise than an advisor, the judge should weight the
advisor’s advice equal to his or her own opinion. Although receiving advice usually does
improve judges’ decisions relative to not receiving advice, a vast amount of research has
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shown that judges tend to weight their own opinion more than twice as heavily as the
advice they receive (Larrick, Mannes, & Soll, 2012). This “egocentric advice
discounting” (Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) has been found to be extremely
robust and has been replicated in a large number of decision situations with different
types of judges and advisors (Banaccio & Dalal, 2006).
Importantly, judges do take the expertise of their advisors into account when evaluating
their position. Thus, judges discount their advisors’ view less when the advisors are
known experts or their past advice proved to be accurate (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997).
Judges are also more likely to use advice when making judgments in unfamiliar domains
(Harvey & Fisher, 1997), and they learn to discount poor advice to a greater degree than
good advice (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). However, judges are not always accurate in
their appraisals of an advisor’s expertise. Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) have shown that
one of the best predictors of a judge’s use of advice is advisor confidence, which is poorly
correlated with advisor accuracy. Less discounting has been found for advice that is
solicited by the judge than for advice that is simply provided (Gibbons, Sniezek, & Dalal,
2003). In addition, judges discount less when the task is complex (Schrah, Dalal, &
Sniezek, 2006), when there are financial incentives for being accurate (Sniezek & Van
Swol, 2001), and when they trust the advisor (Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). However,
discounting is present in virtually all judge–advisor situations, and it almost always
reduces decision accuracy.
A number of different explanations for the egocentric discounting effect have been
proposed. One of the earliest explanations was based on anchoring and adjustment
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Harvey and Fischer (1997) argued that the judge’s initial
estimate served as an anchor and judges did not adjust enough when they were provided
with the advice. However, studies have shown the discounting effect even when no initial
evaluation is present upon which to anchor (Banaccio & Dalal, 2006). Yaniv (2004) has
argued that the effect is due to the information advantage judges have about their own
estimates. Judges should know why they chose their initial position, yet they may know
very little about why advisors gave the advice they did. Yaniv and Choshen-Hillel (2012)
showed that forcing judges to choose initial positions based on virtually no information
drastically reduced the discounting effect. However, Soll and Larrick (2009) found almost
no effect of varying the amount of information judges had about the advisors’ reasons for
their choices. Krueger (2003) has argued that the effect is simply another instance of a
general egocentric bias that occurs in many domains of judgment. The bias leads people
to focus their attention on certain aspects of the self, and they typically perceive
themselves as more capable than others on average. Larrick, Mannes, and Soll (2012; see
also Soll & Mannes, 2011) also argue that judges’ positions are “owned” by them and
become part of the self, thus making them difficult to give up.
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Implications for Learning
Similar to prediction markets, most of the research on judge–advisor systems has focused
on either judgment accuracy or the weighting of the advice in final judgments (Banaccio
& Dalal, 2006). Most of this research has shown that receiving advice improves
performance and that weighting the advice equal to the judge’s initial judgment leads to
the best performance. From this perspective, most decision makers do not learn optimally
because they tend to underweight the advice they receive when forming their final
judgment.
Little research in this area attempts to assess “transfer,” that is, how well people make
judgments on similar issues following the receipt of advice. However, a recent study by
Tindale, Jacobs, and Starkel (2009) has begun to address these issues in a limited domain.
Tindale et al. had individuals work on probabilistic inference tasks that tend to produce
responses that violate the laws of probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983) but also
allowed them to receive advice in a standard judge–advisor system format. However, they
controlled the type of advice the judges received. Each participant received information
from two advisors. Both advisors gave normatively correct responses, normatively
incorrect responses (consistent with the typical participant response), or split responses,
with one advisor giving correct advice and the other giving incorrect advice. In addition,
half of the participants received statements from the advisors justifying their responses,
and half did not. The correct advice was paired with statements based on normatively
correct logic, while the incorrect advice was paired with statements based on the biased
logic that leads to the errors. Finally, all participants responded to a second problem of
the same type. For the problem where advice was given, only participants who received
two correct pieces of advice showed any improvement. However, for the second problem,
only participants who received two pieces of correct advice paired with normatively
correct logic statements showed any improvement. Participants who did not receive the
arguments responded no better than participants who received poor advice or no advice
at all. Although the problems used were of a limited nature, it appears simply receiving
advice can lead to better judgments on the problem for which the advice was given, but
this may not lead judges to learn how to make better judgments in the future.

Fully Interacting Groups: Review
Most of the research on group decision making has focused on groups in which members
meet together face to face and discuss a decision problem until they reach consensus.
Early research in this area focused on member preferences as the major feature
predicting group decision outcomes (Davis, 1973; Kameda, Tindale, & Davis, 2003). More
recent research has focused on how groups process information (Hinsz, Tindale, &
Vollrath, 1997) and the degree to which available information is used by the group
(Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Shulz-Hardt, 2007; Lu, Yuan, & McLeod,
2012). Kameda, Tindale, and Davis (2003; see also Tindale & Kameda, 2000) have
proposed that “social sharedness” can explain many of the findings associated with
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attainment of group consensus. Social sharedness refers to task-relevant cognitions
(broadly defined) that the members of a group have in common, or share, which exert a
greater influence on group decisions than do similar cognitions that are not shared
among the members. These shared cognitions can vary from preferences for decision
alternatives or information about the alternatives to heuristic information-processing
strategies that the members cannot even articulate. However, the greater the degree of
sharedness of a particular task-relevant cognition, the greater the likelihood that it will
influence the group decision. In general, social sharedness is often adaptive and probably
evolved as a useful aspect of living in groups (Kameda & Tindale, 2004). However, a shift
in context in which the shared cognition is inappropriate to the current situation can lead
groups to make poor decisions.

Socially Shared Preferences
Early work on group decision making tended to focus on the distribution of initial
member preferences and how such preferences get combined into a group, or collective,
response (Davis, 1969, 1973; Steiner, 1972). This is known as the “combinatorial
approach” to group decision making (Davis, 1982). One of the most widely used
frameworks under this approach has been social decision scheme (SDS) theory (Davis,
1973). SDS theory assumes that the group members know a set of discrete decision
alternatives and that each member favors a particular alternative at the beginning of
deliberation. It then attempts to describe the group consensus process using a matrix of
conditional probabilities mapping different member preference distributions to different
consensus choices made by the group. For example, in a six-person group choosing
between two decision alternatives (e.g., guilty vs. not guilty in a jury), there are seven
ways in which the group members might initially array themselves across the
alternatives: six guilty and zero not guilty, five guilty and one not guilty, … zero guilty and
six not guilty. Given a population of potential group members in which some proportion
favors one alternative over the other (e.g., 40% favor guilty and 60% favor not guilty), the
likelihood of each initial preference distribution is estimable. The SDS matrix then maps
each initial preference distribution to a distribution of group outcomes based on theory or
a set of assumptions concerning the consensus process by which members’ initial
preferences are reconciled.
One of the key findings of studies using this framework is that majority/plurality models
do a fairly good job of representing the data from many group decision-making studies
(Kameda, Tindale, & Davis, 2003; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Although some contexts are
better described by higher order majorities (e.g., criminal mock juries are well described
by two-thirds majority models), the position with the largest initial support tends to be
chosen by the group in most types of decisions. Kameda et al. (2003) have argued that
majority/plurality models reflect social sharedness at the preference level. One of the key
aspects of majority/plurality processes is that they tend to exacerbate in the final group
distribution those response tendencies that are prevalent at the initial individual level.
Thus, in situations where the outcome of a decision can be defined as good or bad (or at
least better or worse) by some criteria, a majority/plurality process leads groups to make
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better decisions than the average individual when individuals tended toward the “good”
response alternative. However, exactly the same process leads groups to make worse
decisions than the average individual when individuals tended toward the “bad” response
alternative. Thus, since the majority/plurality process pushes the group in the direction
initially favored by most of its members, it can lead to either good or poor decisions,
depending on how members initially lean.
Fortunately, it appears that majority/plurality processes tend to lead to good decisions in
many natural decision settings involving groups (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Sorkin, Hays, &
West, 2001; Sorkin, West, & Robinson, 1998). Hastie and Kameda (2005) compared a
variety of different ways groups could choose to move forward in an uncertain
environment with many different response options. Overall, they found that a simple
majority/plurality process (i.e., going with the alternative with the greater degree of
support) was more accurate than any other decision rule with similar computational
complexity. Majority models did even better than best member models (going with the
alternative preferred by the person whose choices have been most accurate in the past)
and performed similarly to models that required much greater levels of computation (e.g.,
weighted averaging models based on past performance). Hastie and Kameda (2005)
argued that the generally high levels of accuracy combined with the low computational
load might explain why majority processes are so pervasive in social aggregates. In a
similar vein, Sorkin et al. (2001) developed a signal detection model of group
performance and found that optimal group performance based on weighting individual
members by their decision accuracy is only marginally better than using a majority/
plurality process and that majorities tended to perform very close to optimal levels. Using
these same models, Sorkin and his colleagues also showed that simple majorities tend to
perform better than “super” majorities (those requiring 60% or 67% member agreement
to reach a consensus; Sorkin et al., 1998). Thus, although majority/plurality processes can
both attenuate and exacerbate errors in group decision making, they tend toward the
former in many natural environments.
Majority/plurality models are well defined when decision alternatives are discrete and
groups are asked to choose one of the possible alternatives. However, many group
decision tasks require groups to reach consensus on a point along a continuum (e.g.,
amount of money to invest or an estimation of the likelihood of some event) where it is
unlikely that members’ specific positions will overlap. Thus, majority/plurality models of
group choice are not appropriate for groups making ratings or estimations (Stasser &
Dietz-Uhler, 2001). Although a variety of models can be (and have been) applied to these
types of situations (see Grofman & Owen, 1986; Hinsz, 1999 for examples), we will focus
mainly on three that have received a reasonable amount of empirical support.
One of the most basic models of group judgment on estimation tasks is a simple
arithmetic average. Assuming each group member starts discussion with a well-defined
preference point, and assuming each member is equally influential, the mean of the initial
distribution seems a reasonable compromise. It is also possible that means or other
central tendency points serve as focal points (Schelling, 1960) and provide a salient
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resolution point for resolving preference differences. A number of studies have found that
a simple averaging model provides a decent approximation of final group outcomes
(Gigone & Hastie, 1993), especially when groups are making multiple judgments in a
limited timeframe.
Another model that has fared well empirically is the median model (Black, 1958; Crott et
al., 1991; Davis et al., 1997; Laughlin, 2011). Black’s (1958) work on social choice models
showed that median positions form an equilibrium under certain circumstances and thus
are likely to be stable group choice outcomes. His median voter theorem posited that
when member preference curves are single peaked (i.e., each member has a single
preferred point along the response continuum and a member’s evaluation of other points
on the continuum is relatively lower as a function of his or her distance from that
preferred point), the median of the members’ initial preferences is the most stable
outcome (see Laughlin, 2011, for a more thorough discussion of social choice models).
Crott et al. (1991) showed that a median model could explain group polarization and
provided a very good fit to group consensus data on choice dilemma items. Davis et al.
(1997) also found a median model to provide a good fit to damage award judgments by
mock civil juries.
Davis (1996) also derived a group consensus model for continuous response dimensions
called the social judgment schemes (SJS) model. The model assumes that the amount of
influence a particular group member has on the final group response is an inverse
exponential function of the sum of the distances from that member’s position to all other
members’ positions. Thus, members who are most similar to other members on the
response dimension have greater influence on the final group response than do members
whose preferences are less similar to other members overall (see Davis, 1996; Kameda,
Tindale, & Davis, 2003, for a more formal discussion of the model). The model is similar
to a median model in that it underweights deviant or outlying positions, but it differs from
a median model in that all group members get at least some influence on the final
decision. Research has shown a good fit between model predictions and data for
consensus group judgments in a number of group decision settings (Davis et al., 1997;
Hulbert, Parks, Chen, Nam, & Davis, 1999; Ohtsubo, Masuchi, & Nakanishi, 2002) and
also demonstrated its similarity to the median model (Davis et al., 1997).
Kameda, Tindale, and Davis (2003; see also Tindale & Kameda, 2000) have argued that
both the SJS model and the median model are similar to majority/plurality models in that
they represent social sharedness at the preference level. On a continuous response
dimension, members often will not have exactly the same preference. However, the SJS
model explicitly gives more weight to members whose preferences share similar spaces
on the dimension, and median models tend to do this as well, though less directly by
basically ignoring outliers. Thus, the member preferences that share a relatively narrow
region on the response dimension become quite influential, and the greater the degree of
sharedness (the more members who all share the same general area of the response
dimension), the more likely it is that the group’s final response will be located within that
region. Much like majority/plurality processes, both SJS and median models predict
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groups will outperform individuals when most members show a bias toward better or
more accurate positions on the continuum. However, if the typical individual is biased
toward a less optimal or accurate scale position, these models will exacerbate the bias
and lead to group performance decrements (Kerr & Tindale, 2011).

Socially Shared Cognitions
A major theme and dominant paradigm underlying much of the work on group decision
making and performance over the past 25 years had its start with a paper by Stasser and
Titus (1985). Using a paradigm called the “hidden profile,” Stasser and Titus showed that
information that was initially shared by all of the group members was much more likely to
be brought up during group discussion and was much more influential in the final group
decision than was information held by only one member. By giving all the positive
information about an inferior alternative to all members, and dividing the greater amount
of positive information about a superior alternative among the group members so that
each member only has part of it, Stasser and Titus showed that groups rarely shared
enough of the unshared information to allow the group to realize that their initial
consensus alternative was not as good as the optimal one. When all members shared all
of the information, groups easily found the superior alternative. The “shared information”
or “common knowledge” effect (Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987), as
it came to be called, has been replicated hundreds of times, and the hidden profile
paradigm has dominated group decision-making research ever since (see Brodbeck et al.,
2007, for review).
Probably the main reason the initial finding had such a profound impact on the field was
that different information provided by different group members was seen as one of the
key features of group processes that allowed groups to outperform individuals (Davis,
1969; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). Although there is now a fair amount of evidence that
groups do in fact perform better if their members share their unique information
(Brodbeck et al., 2007), it is also quite clear that groups do not do this naturally in many
settings (Stasser, 1999). The fact that shared, as opposed to unshared, information plays
a much larger role in most group decision settings definitely changed the way most
researchers thought about groups and led to many studies attempting to better
understand the phenomenon and discover ways to increase information sharing in
groups.
Most of the current research findings have been nicely encapsulated by Brodbeck et al.
(2007) in their information asymmetries model of group decision making. The model
categorizes the various conditions that lead to poor information processing in groups into
three basic categories. The first category, negotiation focus, encompasses the various
issues surrounding initial member preferences. If groups view the decision-making task
mainly as a negotiation with winners and losers, members negotiating which alternative
should be chosen tend to focus on alternatives and not on the information underlying
them. The second category, discussion bias, encompasses those aspects of group
discussion that tend to favor shared versus unshared information (e.g., items shared by
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many members are more likely to be discussed). The third category, evaluation bias,
encompasses the various positive perceptions associated with shared information (e.g.,
shared information is more valid, sharing shared information leads to positive evaluations
by other group members). All three categories reflect features of typical group decision
making and can lead to biased group decisions and inhibit cross-fertilization of ideas and
individual member learning (Brodbeck et al., 2007).
A key aspect of Brodbeck et al.’s (2007) model is that the various aspects of information
processing in groups only lead to negative outcomes when information is distributed
asymmetrically across group members, as when a hidden profile is present. Although
such situations do occur and groups can make disastrous decisions under such
circumstances (Janis, 1982; Messick, 2006), they are not typical of most group decision
environments. In situations where members have independently gained their information
through experience, the shared information they have is probably highly valid and more
useful than unique information or beliefs held by only one member. Thus, the fact that
members share preferences and information in many group decision contexts is probably
adaptive and has generally served human survival well (Hastie & Kameda, 2005; Kameda
& Tindale, 2006). In addition, groups are often (but not always) sensitive to cues in the
environment that indicate that information is not symmetrically distributed (Brauner,
Judd, & Jacquelin, 2001; Stewart & Stasser, 1998). Although minorities often are not very
influential in groups, if minority members have at their disposal critical information that
others do not have and that implies the initial group consensus may be wrong, other
group members will pay attention to them. And, as discussed later, minority members
who favor superior alternatives in environments where the superiority can be
demonstrated can be very persuasive and lead majorities to switch their preferences
(Laughlin & Ellis, 1986).
Given the pervasiveness of the shared information effect, a fair amount of research has
focused on how to increase the likelihood that all relevant information is brought up
during group discussion. One partial remedy is to make sure that groups have a record of
all of the information present during group discussion (Sheffey et al., 1989). There is
some recent evidence that group support systems can aid in this regard by allowing
greater access to such information (Haseman & Ramamurthy, 2004). Studies have shown
that groups that share an accuracy or problem-solving orientation to the decision
problem bring up more unique information and perform better than groups with a
consensus orientation (Postmes et al., 2001; Stewart & Stasser, 1995). Setting up a norm
of information sharing or having a leader who encourages and stimulates information
exchange throughout the process has shown promise in terms of greater information
sharing and better performance (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998). Also,
instructing group members to avoid forming initial impressions or preferences, and not
allowing such preferences if present to be shared early in the discussion, have also been
shown to be helpful (Larson et al., 1998; Mojzisch & Schulz-Hardt, 2010). Setting up a
transactive memory system (Wegner, 1987) where certain group members are responsible
for certain types of information also has been shown to help groups process more
information (Stasser, Vaughan, & Stewart, 2000). Groups that structure their tasks such
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that information is exchanged completely before any discussion of preferences or final
decisions also tend to perform better (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & ShulzHardt, 2002). The main things that seem to be important are a focus on information
rather than preferences, memory aids or reduced information load per group member,
and a focus on accuracy over consensus (Brodbeck et al., 2007).
Specific pieces of information (and preferences) are not the only types of cognitions that
group members can share (Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991; Tindale & Kameda, 2000).
Laughlin (1980, 2011) has argued that one of the reasons that groups are usually better
problem solvers than individuals is that group members often share a conceptual system
that allows them to realize when a proposed solution is correct within that system. This
shared conceptual system, or background knowledge, is what allows a minority member
with a correct answer to influence a larger incorrect faction to change its preference to
the correct alternative. Such situations are well described by SDS models called “Truth
Wins” and “Truth Supported Wins” (Laughlin, 1980). Truth Wins predicts that any group
that has at least one member with the correct answer will be able to solve the problem
correctly (Laughlin, 1980). Truth Supported Wins argues that at least two members of the
group must have the correct answer in order for the group to solve the problem correctly
(Laughlin, 1980). For groups with more than four members, both models predict minority
influence for minorities with the correct answer. Laughlin and Ellis (1986) proposed that
such minority influence processes are likely to occur for demonstrable or “intellective”
tasks (those that have a demonstrably correct solution) and that the shared conceptual
system is a key component of demonstrability. For “judgmental” tasks (those without a
demonstrably correct solution), majority/plurality processes are more likely to occur.
Tindale, Smith, Thomas, Filkins, and Sheffey (1996) argued that the shared conceptual
system underlying demonstrability is one instance of what they referred to as “shared
task representations.” They defined a shared task representation as “any task/situation
relevant concept, norm, perspective, or cognitive process that is shared by most or all of
the group members” (Tindale et al., 1996, p. 84). “Task/situation relevant” means that the
representation must have implications for the choice alternatives involved, and the
degree to which a shared representation affects group decision processes and outcomes
will vary as a function of its relevance. Its influence will also vary as a function of the
degree to which it is shared among the group members—the greater the degree of
sharedness (the more members who share it), the greater its influence. If no shared task
representation exists, or if multiple conflicting representations are present, groups will
tend to follow a symmetric majority/plurality process. However, when a shared task
representation does exist, the group decision process will tend to become asymmetric in
favor of alternatives that fit within or are supported by the representation. Under such
conditions, majorities/pluralities favoring an alternative consistent with the shared
representation are more powerful than are identically sized majorities/pluralities favoring
alternatives that are not consistent with or supported by the representation. In addition,
minorities favoring an alternative consistent with the shared representation can
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sometimes be more influential than majorities favoring an alternative inconsistent with
the shared representation.
Although Laughlin’s work (1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) is probably the strongest
example of the effects of shared representations, a number of other potent examples
exist. For example, much of the work on mock-jury decision making (MacCoun & Kerr,
1988; Tindale, Nadler, Krebel, & Davis, 2001) has shown that “not guilty” is an easier
verdict to defend than “guilty.” In other words, majorities favoring guilty are less
successful than are majorities favoring not guilty. In addition, juries that are evenly
divided between guilty and not guilty, and even some juries with a sizable minority
favoring not guilty, reach a not guilty verdict much of the time (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988).
MacCoun and Kerr showed that this asymmetry toward not guilty only occurs when juries
are provided with a “reasonable doubt” verdict criterion. Tindale et al. (1996) argued that
the reasonable doubt criterion serves as a shared task representation that tells jurors
that they should look for and pay attention to reasonable doubts, and, if they exist, they
should vote not guilty. More recent research has shown that religion can also work as a
shared task representation. Smith, Dykema-Engblade, Walker, Niven, and McGrough
(2000) showed that minorities against the death penalty were persuasive in altering
majority positions on the issue when they framed their arguments in terms of religion
(“Thou shalt not kill”), whereas other types of arguments were ineffective. The shared
religious orientations of the group members provided a context within which religious
arguments could be very effective, even though they conflicted with the majority’s initial
preference.
A number of studies have shown that individual decision biases can act as shared task
representations, unexpectedly leading groups to perform worse in certain decision
situations than comparable single individuals. Tindale (1989) showed that biased
feedback meant to induce a conservative (high criterion) promotion strategy in a job
situation led minorities favoring the option to not promote an employee to win out over
majorities favoring the option to promote. Tindale (1993) also showed that groups
exacerbate typical error tendencies found at the individual level. Kahneman, Slovic, and
Tversky (1982) describe how individuals often violate the rules of probability when
making intuitive judgments that involve probabilities. For example, individuals sometimes
estimate the likelihood of conjunctive events as greater than one or both of the
elementary events involved in the conjunction. Since the conjunction is a subset of the
elementary events, such a judgment is inconsistent with the basic laws of probability.
Tindale (1993) found that for conjunctive probability judgments, where individuals are
likely to make such errors, groups made even more errors. In addition, groups were more
influenced by members who made errors than they were by members who avoided such
errors. However, groups made fewer errors than individuals and did not show the
asymmetric influence processes for conjunction problems that were not prone to
individual errors. A number of studies have found similar error exacerbation tendencies
with other types of decision biases (Argote, Devadas, & Melone, 1990; Hinsz, Tindale, &
Nagao, 2008).
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Much of the work demonstrating the effects of shared task representations has involved
ad hoc groups in which the shared background knowledge or approach to the task was
acquired from members’ prior experiences or shared environments. However, groups can
create shared structures for defining how the group operates and approaches its task.
Such structures are typically referred to as group-level or shared mental models (CannonBowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Hinsz, 1995). Mental models refer to mental
representations of the task and the behaviors associated with performing the task (Rouse
& Morris, 1986). At the group level, mental models also involve roles and
interdependencies among group members. Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) differentiated
between task models and team models. Task models involve the various steps involved in
the task and the resources (equipment, etc.) necessary to accomplish it. Group, or team,
models involve the information and skills that members have that are relevant to the task
and the ways in which their skills and behaviors must be coordinated in order to move
efficiently toward task completion. Team mental models can enhance performance to the
degree that the models are accurate and the members all share the same model. Team
training on both task and team models tends to improve performance by insuring that all
aspects of both models are shared (Weiner, Kanki, & Helmreich, 1993). Such performance
enhancements have been shown for cockpit crews on jetliners and surgery teams in
hospitals.
However, sharedness for either the task or group model will only enhance performance to
the degree that the model is accurate. Stasser and Augustinova (2008) have shown that
distributed decision situations often produce better outcomes if information is simply sent
up through the system by each group member without requiring any type of intermediary
judgments by others. However, many groups assume that allowing judgments from
various members is useful and thus use such a model to guide their behavior. Although
aggregate judgments by many actors with different types and amount of information tend
to be more accurate than judgments made by single individuals (Kerr & Tindale, 2011), in
distributed systems where each member has only one type of information, asking all of
the members to make judgments adds noise to the system. In addition, research has
shown that it is better for members not to know that others might have the same
information that they do because it reduces their feelings of criticality and decreases the
likelihood that they will send all of their relevant information forward. Tschan et al.
(2009) have shown that critical information easily available to emergency medical teams
is often overlooked because each member assumes that someone else would have
discovered and presented the information if it were relevant. Thus, intuitive mental
models shared by group members can inhibit performance if they are inaccurate in terms
of the task or if they lead to decreased information sharing. Once again, although shared
mental models often tend to improve group decision making, they can also lead to poor
decisions when what is shared is inappropriate for the particular decision context.
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Implications for Learning
Fully interacting groups typically have the greatest potential for learning. Because all
members can contribute to the discussion of the task, the knowledge each member has
should be available to the group as a whole. However, research has shown that groups
are not naturally optimal learning environments. Members do not share all of their
information, and what information they do share is more likely to be commonly known
rather than unique to a specific member (Stasser & Titus, 1985). Members also tend to
argue for their initial position rather than being open to others’ perspectives (Mojzisch &
Schulz-Hardt, 2010). Groups also tend to form a consensus before discussing all of the
information, which often leads to satisfactory but not optimal choices (Kerr & Tindale,
2004; Stasser & Titus, 1985). In addition, inappropriate shared representations can
influence members away from normatively correct positions they initially held (Tindale et
al., 1996). However, groups and their members do learn and sometimes they learn even
in less than optimal situations. In addition, under the right circumstances, groups can be
powerful learning environments.
Learning in groups is often described as the process of group-to-individual transfer
(Laughlin, Carey, & Kerr, 2008; Laughlin, 2011). It assumes that if members learned how
to solve a problem while working in the group, they should be able to solve the problem
on their own after leaving the group. Laughlin (2011) describes two types of transfer:
specific transfer, in which members can now solve the same problems that were solved by
the group, and general transfer, in which members can solve similar but new problems
that were not initially solved by the group. Although both types of transfer can indicate
learning, general transfer is usually considered the more important type of learning
because it can be used in future problem-solving endeavors. Laughlin (2011) also
distinguishes between complete and partial transfer, in which complete transfer implies
that members can now perform as well as their group did.
Another key concept for understanding group learning, again developed by Laughlin
(1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986), is demonstrability. Laughlin (1980) argued that there is a
continuum along which group tasks can be located with the endpoints defined as
intellective versus judgmental. Intellective tasks are those in which group members can
demonstrate the correctness of a particular solution during group discussion (e.g., math
story problems). Judgmental tasks do not allow for such demonstration, and thus
differences among members are often resolved based on how many members favor each
alternative (e.g., majority wins). Laughlin and Ellis (1986) defined four conditions
necessary for demonstrability to exist: a conceptual system for solving the problem is
shared among the group members; available information is sufficient for solving the
problem; all members understand the conceptual system; and members with correct
solutions have the ability, time, and motivation to use the conceptual system to
demonstrate the correctness of their choice. Laughlin (2011) argues that the ability to
demonstrate the correctness of a response underlies both why groups tend to outperform
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individuals and why group-to-individual transfer, particularly general transfer, occurs.
Obviously, group discussion and interaction are necessary for demonstration to occur.
Much like members of noninteracting groups, as long as member preferences are shared
at some point in time, members of interacting groups can learn how their positions
compare to others and whether they are normative (e.g., in the majority) or deviant.
Interacting groups can also learn from outcome feedback, and the group discussion can
aid in this learning. A number of studies have shown that groups learn to play economic
games rationally much faster than individuals (Bornstein, 2003; Insko et al., 1994). For
example, Fahr and Irlenbusch (2011) showed that groups were far better than individuals
at learning to ignore specific instance feedback when it went against more general data
trends. Kagel and McGee (2016) found that groups playing many rounds of a prisoner’s
dilemma game would shift their strategy toward cooperation when feedback suggested
that cooperation risks were beneficial. Tindale et al. (2006) also found that groups were
more sensitive than individuals to changes in payoff structure for games. Thus, as
feedback and environmental conditions change, groups seem quite capable of adapting
their behavior to fit the conditions.
Unfortunately, environmental feedback can be both variable and incomplete. Einhorn and
Hogarth (1978) showed that in many decision-making situations, feedback on decision
accuracy only occurs for the chosen option (e.g., people who are hired as opposed to
those not hired). Under such conditions, feedback can be misleading. However, there is
some evidence that groups can learn from feedback even under less than optimal
circumstances. Tindale (1989) compared individuals and groups on a multicue decision
task (promoting low-level managers into middle-level positions). Initial practice rounds
were designed to instill a conservative (do not promote) decision bias, while in the main
decision set (48 candidates) approximately half deserved promotion. Individuals and
groups received either no feedback, feedback after promotion decisions, or feedback
after all decisions. Groups quickly learned to reduce the conservative bias in the total
feedback condition and also greatly outperformed individuals. In the no-feedback
condition, neither individuals nor groups improved much over trials. However, in the
partial feedback condition, groups slowly reduced the conservative bias and were
performing almost as well as the total feedback groups by the last set of trials. It
appeared that groups would occasionally choose to promote a less-than-stellar candidate
and then receive positive feedback that it was the correct decision. Thus, groups slowly
reduced their false-negative decision errors even under suboptimal feedback conditions.
The greatest advantage for fully interacting groups as compared to more restricted types
of interaction is that members can share their knowledge and the rationales behind the
positions they support. In other words, full interaction allows demonstration to be used to
resolve preference difference among the group members. Laughlin (2011) has argued
that demonstration is what allows correct minorities to overpower incorrect majorities so
that groups will outperform individuals. Much of the evidence behind his argument
stemmed from findings that the influence processes in problem-solving groups could be
well represented by a “truth supported wins” model (Laughlin, 1980). Laughlin (2011) has
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shown that this model fits well for many different types of decision problems that fall near
the intellective end of the intellective–judgmental continuum. Although truth supported
wins is consistent with demonstration as a conflict resolution strategy, the model fit does
not address whether demonstration was actually used. However, a number of recent
studies have shown that groups that perform well tend to lead to member learning and
that demonstration is a key component.
Olivera and Straus (2004) had individuals work on intellective puzzles and then had them
participate in a group working on the same puzzles, observe a different group work on
the puzzles, or simply work on the puzzles again as individuals. Finally, they assessed
learning by having individuals work on a related set of puzzles. Participants that either
worked in or observed groups showed improvement in their ability to solve the puzzles
relative to their initial performance, whereas individuals working alone showed no such
improvement. Olivera and Straus also measured a number of cognitive (task information,
strategy discussions, etc.) and social (approval, joking, etc.) aspects of the groups and
found that the cognitive aspects of the group interaction produced the better
performance. Curseu, Meslec, Pluut, and Lucas (2015) looked at group-to-individual
transfer on a series of decision tasks and also measured individual members’ level of
“rationality” in terms of normative decision-making strategies. For groups that performed
well, there was strong evidence for group-to-individual transfer, and the size of the
difference was associated with improved cognitive decision-making strategies of the
initially less able group members. Thus, participating in a group where other members
could demonstrate the correctness of a particular alternative allowed less able members
to learn the correct or rational approaches to the decision problems.
With such solid evidence that groups resolving member preference differences through
demonstration leads to learning and better group performance, it remains puzzling why
there is not more evidence in the literature for group-to-individual transfer. Although
many situations find some transfer, rarely is it complete, and in some cases it is
nonexistent (Stasson, Kameda, Parks, Zimmerman, & Davis, 1991; Tindale, 1993). One
reason may be the difficulty of accurately recognizing member expertise. Although
Bonner and Baumann (2012; see also Baumman & Bonner 2011) have shown that groups
can incorporate member expertise into their decision making, it is often not weighted
optimally. Also, groups typically rely on perceived expertise to guide their decision
making, and there is not a one-to-one relationship between actual and perceived
expertise. Littlepage et al. (1997) found that members tended to rate the expertise of
other members as a function of how much they talked during discussion, yet the
correlation between talking and actual expertise was virtually nonexistent. Bonner and
Baumman (2012) also showed that without an intervention to help groups recognize their
expertise, member extroversion was a better predictor of perceived expertise than was
actual expertise.
It is also the case that, although groups can use demonstration, they often do not.
Aramovich and Larson (2013) looked at five-person groups solving simple math problems
and coded the group discussions for evidence of different types of consensus processes
Page 22 of 34

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: University of Illinois - Springfield; date: 15 May 2019

Learning While Deciding in Groups
(demonstration, voting or majority wins, etc.). They found that groups that had a majority
of correct members used demonstration less than 50% of the time, and the greatest use
of demonstration (75%) occurred when only two members had the correct solution. When
groups had only one member with a correct solution, demonstration was only used 50%
of the time—a drop of 25% compared to the two correct member groups. This finding
helps to explain why simply having a single correct member often does not lead to correct
group judgments since single correct members were less likely to try and demonstrate
the correctness of their response. It also helps to explain why transfer is often less than
complete. When groups had a four-person majority of correct members, they rarely
demonstrated the correctness of their choices to the lone incorrect member. Fortunately,
the researchers also found that providing a goal of using demonstration to the groups
substantially increased its use. Similar results have been found for providing goals for
information sharing in groups (Van Ginkle, Tindale, & Van Knippenburg, 2009).

Summary and Conclusions
We have summarized the literature on group decision making with a focus on how
learning could and does occur while groups are deciding. We have argued that groups
and their members can learn, at least to some degree, with any of the various group
decision procedures we described. Learning can occur from simply knowing that others
either agree or disagree with one’s position, and often knowing the final aggregated
group position can lead members to make more accurate decisions. Another general
finding is that environmental feedback is critical to learning, especially for those
procedures that limit group member interaction. Finally, we have found that fully
interacting groups have the greatest potential for learning, and such procedures typically
do lead to learning, if often less than optimally so.
We would like to close with a description of what we feel would be the optimal conditions
for group to learn while deciding. Many of the key ingredients are specified in Laughlin
and Ellis’s (1986) definition of demonstrability. First, a certain amount of shared
background knowledge in the domain of interest is necessary for group members to learn
from each other and from whatever feedback they receive. Without such shared
knowledge, members may not be able to understand the arguments put forth by other
members during the consensus process. However, diversity of knowledge and opinion
within the group is needed for learning to occur. If all knowledge and information are
shared among the group members, there will be quick consensus and little discussion,
even if the consensus is for suboptimal position (Stasser & Titus, 1985; Tindale, 1993).
Group members also need to have the time and the motivation to both present their ideas
and (especially) to listen to the ideas of others. A recent study by Mellers et al. (2014)
found that over and above high levels of motivation and cognitive/analytic skills, a key
predictor of how accurate groups were in making forecasts was members’ openmindedness. If members were willing to listen to others and change their individual
forecasts based on the arguments of these people, the groups made better forecasts. This
also assumes that members feel comfortable enough to share their ideas with the rest of
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the group. Recent research has also shown that trust is a key variable for information
sharing in groups (Van Ginkel, Tindale, & Van Knippenberg, 2009), and groups made up
of members with prosocial orientations tend to perform better than groups with
competitive or pro-self members (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Kippenburg, 2008).
Research has shown what is needed in decision-making groups in order for learning to
take place, but more research should be focused on how to ensure that such conditions
are met. It may be time for group decision researchers to begin paying attention to the
work on learning in student groups to see how interventions in that domain may be useful
to decision-making groups as well. Decision making is almost always better in groups,
and learning almost always makes for better decision making. Thus, research attempting
to ensure the appropriate mix of group members, environment, and feedback should be a
fruitful endeavor.
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